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Introduction

On September 19, 2016, militants allegedly backed by Pakistan, attacked an Indian Army camp in
Uri. The government in New Delhi, which was facing important regional elections, encountered
intense public pressure to muster a military response. Such a response, however, ran the risk of
triggering a nuclear exchange with devastating consequences. Ten days later, India reported that it
had carried out “surgical strikes” on terrorist training camps in Pakistan-controlled territory. The
paper examines this specific episode in India-Pakistan deterrence dynamics, focusing on the
nomenclature “surgical strikes.” It argues that the choice of the term itself is new and worthy of
investigation. The significance of this investigation lies in the fact that the term ‘surgical strike’ can
be useful for de-escalation and perception management in some circumstances, while engendering
dangerous and destabilizing outcomes in others.
The first section briefly furnishes the strategic context of India-Pakistan nuclear deterrence, claiming
that the surgical strikes are a response by India to the imperatives of the strategic situation. This
section also describes the Uri attacks and India’s military response. The second section identifies the
various rhetorical moves by the Indian government that framed the response as a surgical strike,
using qualitative content analysis of the official announcement of the operation. It also considers
other statements in the media by high-ranking political and military leaders regarding the strikes. The
third section shows how these statements were received by the domestic audience, by Pakistan, and
by the international community. The concluding section sounds a note of caution about future
iterations of so-called surgical strikes.

Deterrence

India and Pakistan tested nuclear weapons in May 1998; however, the two countries had already
possessed nuclear warheads and delivery systems for several years. India justified its possession with
reference to both Chinese and Pakistani nuclear capabilities. The Chinese threat is more of a longterm geopolitical challenge. Pakistan is the adversary that is more likely to probe Indian defenses,
and support militants attacking key Indian interests. This section elaborates on the constraints that
India faces as it comes up with responses to these Pakistani policies, i.e. its strategic imperatives.
Over twenty years ago, Ashley Tellis described the strategic situation between India and Pakistan as
“ugly stability.” The possibility of full-scale war is eliminated by the desire to avoid a nuclear
exchange. At the same time, given that the adversaries have intense and unresolved conflicts, there
are strong incentives for sub-strategic operations (e.g. sponsoring militant attacks and launching
limited military operations) (Tellis 1997). Some scholars have applied the Cold War concept of the
‘stability-instability paradox’ to the India-Pakistan relationship: the more credible deterrence became
at the strategic level, the more violence we would expect at the sub-strategic level (Ganguly 1995).
An alternative causal logic for the same behavior is proposed by Paul Kapur. Pakistani leaders bet
that although India could use its conventional superiority to reverse Pakistani territorial gains, it will
refrain, for fear of a nuclear attack. It is not stability but instability, “the danger of nuclear escalation,
that allows weak, revisionist Pakistan to undertake limited conventional aggression against India in
hopes of altering regional boundaries without provoking a full-scale Indian conventional response”
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(Kapur 2006:41). Kapur concludes that the stability-instability paradox is not the appropriate
concept to explain India-Pakistan deterrence dynamics, and instead proposes the instability-instability
paradox.
No matter which explanation one supports, decision-makers in New Delhi have to come up with
policies to deter Pakistan’s sub-strategic aggression. It is in their interest to signal that they would
respond to such aggression with stringent conventional military responses. However, India wishes to
avoid triggering escalation to the nuclear level. This fear of escalation, then, becomes an asset for
Pakistani strategy. Given that Pakistan is inferior in conventional (non-nuclear) firepower, it has a
powerful incentive to convey the message that it might respond to an Indian conventional attack with
nuclear use. It is no surprise that Pakistan has refused to follow India in ruling out the first use of
nuclear weapons. Pakistan’s official and non-official statements have deliberately made the threshold
for nuclear use (commonly referred to as the ‘red line’) low and ambiguous (Narang 2009/10,
Tasleem 2016).
When terrorists attack Indian assets, Pakistan is often implicated as a supporter of the militants. The
government in New Delhi faces immense (and growing) pressure from citizens to take decisive
military action; however, it is only too aware of the risk that such action will trigger a nuclear
response by Pakistan. It must come up with responses that assuage the public, soothe fears in the
international community, deter future support by Pakistan, and stay under Pakistan’s red lines. To
this end, India has come up with various innovations in deterrence doctrine. Developments in the
Cold War altered deterrence theory (Morgan 2011:148). Similarly, difficulties in practicing deterrence
led India to redefine and employ concepts such as minimum deterrence, No First Use, and assured
retaliation. While these innovations are intended to give India the freedom to maneuver in the
shadow of nuclear weapons, some of them might be destabilizing.
In 1998 the Indian Prime Minister announced to Parliament that India would have a “minimum
credible deterrent” and “a policy of No-First-Use and non-use against non-nuclear weapons states”
(Vajpayee 1998). The No First Use declaration (NFU) and the credible minimum deterrent
formulation together became the touchstones of policy. However, India’s 2003 Draft Nuclear
Doctrine clarifies that “minimum” is a “dynamic concept related to the strategic environment,
technological imperatives and the needs of national security. The actual size of components,
deployment and employment of nuclear forces will be decided in the light of these factors.” The
document also proposes that Indian warheads should be deployed on a triad of delivery vehicles
(land, sea and air) (Arms Control Association 1999). The classical nuclear triad and the refusal to
declare an upper limit on arsenal size, were seen at the time as incompatible with the idea of a
minimum (Bajpai 1999). However, given India’s strategic imperatives in the face of Pakistan’s
insistence on keeping its red lines unclear and low, such a redefinition of minimum is
understandable. Similarly, there has been speculation that India’s No First Use pledge has been
modified, to allow for nuclear first use under some circumstances (Shukla 2017).
Another innovation is in the area of conventional doctrine. The Indian Army reportedly developed a
plan (codenamed Cold Start) in 2010, calling for the swift mobilization. In response to cross-border
incursions, select military units would take and hold small-scale gains in Pakistani territory (Ladwig
III 2007/ 08). In turn, Pakistan is developing short-range missiles that could be used in the
battlefield (Anon 2011, Chansoria 2014). According to some analysts, Pakistan’s policy is leading to
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another shift in doctrine, towards a greater acceptance of counterforce strategies in Indian thinking
(Lalwani and Haegeland 2017). Counterforce strategies, which would target Pakistan’s nuclear assets
such as warheads and missiles, are not necessarily incompatible with the massive retaliation strategy
that was outlined in the 1999 Indian doctrine. During the Cold War, massive retaliation was usually
equated with attacks on cities (or countervalue targeting). India may be modifying the strategy in
accordance with its own strategic imperatives.
The choice of ‘surgical strikes’ is the most recent example of Indian ‘learning’ in response to the
strategic imperatives in South Asia. These imperatives include: signaling to Pakistan that substrategic aggression will be punished, signaling to the international community that India is behaving
as a responsible nuclear power and responding in a limited and justified manner, and signaling to the
increasingly attentive and demanding domestic audience that the government is serious about
countering cross-border terrorism. As Patrick Morgan points out in his study of deterrence as a Cold
War practice, signaling credibility was burdensome and expensive, but in its absence, deterrence was
expected to collapse. Morgan also draws our attention to the link between signaling credibility to the
adversary and domestic political compulsions (the desire not to appear ‘soft’) (Morgan 2011:161). As
will be clear in the next section, the military operations carried out in September 2016 were intended
to send a signal to domestic, regional, and international audiences about India’s preparedness to
respond to cross-border incursions.

Uri attacks and India’s response

Kashmir is the major point of contention between India and Pakistan. Kashmiri militants dissatisfied
with India’s administration found financial and military support across the border. The precise
degree of involvement of Pakistani state agencies in this support is a matter of contention. Kashmir
is divided by the Line of Control (LoC), the de facto border. It is the ceasefire line that was
established by the Simla Agreement which ended the 1971 India-Pakistan war (as opposed to the
International Border, a demarcation that neither state contests).
In an early morning attack on September 18, 2016, armed militants targeted an army camp in Uri, a
garrison town close to Srinagar, the capital of Jammu and Kashmir (Indian Kashmir). 19 Indian
soldiers, headed to take up positions guarding the LoC, were killed. The Indian government claimed
that items bearing Pakistani markings were found at the site, and held the militant group Jaish-eMohammad responsible for the attack (Peri 2016). Later, a different organization, Lashkar-e-Taiba,
was identified as carrying out the attack (Tiwary 2017).
Ten days later, between September 28 and 29, 2016, India struck back with simultaneous raids on
camps in Pakistan Occupied Kashmir (PoK), where militants were allegedly being trained to carry
out attacks in India. The Indian government, headed by the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) with
Narendra Modi as Prime Minister, insisted on describing these military actions as “surgical strikes.”
One estimate is that 70-80 men on the Pakistan side (both uniformed personnel and others not in
uniform) were killed in these raids (Gokhale 2017:loc. 735). Another estimate claims that 38-40
terrorists and two Pakistan Army personnel were killed (Aroor and Singh 2017:23).
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India’s framing of strikes

Saloni Kapur rightly points out that ‘surgical strike’ is a “securitizing” phrase with contestable
meaning (Kapur 2018:71). This section identifies the rhetorical strategies used by Indian decisionmakers to frame their response to the Uri attacks as a surgical strike.

Surgical strikes: definition and criticism

The term ‘surgical strike’ originated in the United States during the Vietnam War (Safire 1986). It has
been gaining currency since the end of the Cold War, and was frequently used in the 1991 Gulf War,
the 1999 war in Kosovo, and in Afghanistan and Iraq (Bissett 2003). Surgical strikes are associated
with the technology of the so-called Revolution in Military Affairs. ‘Prompt Global Strike’ capability
was developed to deliver conventional bombs anywhere in the world, ideally within an hour. Such
strikes were intended to supplement, and potentially replace, both forward deployed troops and
nuclear strikes (Woolf 2017).
Surgical strikes are also relevant in counterproliferation. In the mid-1990s, the Clinton
administration reviewed a plan to conduct surgical strikes on the Yongbyon reactor in North Korea.
However, it became obvious that the result of the surgical strike would be anything but surgical, as it
could trigger an invasion of South Korea by the million-man North Korean army (Perry 2006:81). A
decade later, surgical strikes were advocated against Iranian nuclear facilities which were suspected
of producing fissile material for warheads (Kroenig 2012).
The concept of surgical strikes has also come in for criticism. A prominent social psychologist views
the term as an example of sanitizing language, used to camouflage activities that might otherwise be
seen as repugnant (Bandura 1999:195). Bissett reaffirms this view, and points out that the surgical
metaphor carries connotations of science, precision, control, and asepsis. These values are at odds
with the actualities of modern warfare, but the metaphor makes warfare seem more acceptable, even
desirable. The concept of surgical strikes contains the additional attraction of a technical fix to a
complex political problem (Bissett 2003). James der Derian describes this type of war as “virtuous,”
referring to the illusion that technical capability can “actualize violence from a distance,” with
minimal casualties, thus making the military action ethical (Der Derian 2001:xv).

Was India’s military response a surgical strike?

The Indian government took pains to frame its response to the Uri attacks as a “surgical strike,” as
will be elaborated below. However, we cannot take the designation “surgical” as given. Indian
defense commentator Mohan Guruswamy said that the BJP government’s insistence on the term
was “political charlatanism” (Guruswamy 2016). Pakistan’s official military media wing claimed that
casual cross-border firing was being re-branded as “surgical strikes” (Malhotra 2016). Considering
the thrusts were shallow and did not involve airpower, Sandeep Singh prefers to describe them as
“border raids” (Singh 2016). A retired Pakistan Army officer, Maj. Gen. Asad Durrani prefers the
term “modified hot pursuit” (Dulat, Durrani and Sinha 2018).
Moreover, there is contestation over the actual events of September 2016. Saloni Kapur cites three
different press reports: from the Times of India, the BBC, and the New York Times. Kapur reports that
the Indian newspaper gives a sensational description of a raid by Indian commandos, while the
article in the New York Times casts doubt on any significant action by the Indian military. The BBC’s
reportage describes certain operations by India, though they are not as dramatic as the Times of India
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piece (Kapur 2018). This paper does not take a position on the events that transpired, but seeks to
investigate how they were portrayed and perceived.

Surgical strikes in Indian strategy

Critics of the ruling party in India claimed that similar operations had been carried out in the past,
and that the BJP government had not done anything innovative or remarkable (Tharoor 2018). It is
true that the term ‘surgical strike’ has not been used in a consistent manner in the writing of Indian
strategic analysts, nor in government documents. Interestingly, in response to a query under the
Right to Information Act, the Directorate General of Military Operations of the Indian Army stated
that it does not have records of any surgical strike conducted before September 29, 2016 (Anon
2017).
In the face of terrorist incursions and public pressure to counter them, governments in New Delhi
have been carrying out cross-border operations. The goal was to show that India was not paralyzed
by the fear that Pakistan would quickly escalate the conflict. The Congress Party, now in opposition,
issued a statement with three specific dates —October 1 2011, July 28 2013, and January 14 2014 —
when the Army had launched surgical strikes across the LoC (Manoj 2018). The Foreign Secretary in
the previous Congress-led government, Shivshankar Menon, stated that such operations had not
been publicized, “because they were not aimed at the domestic constituency” (Venu 2016). An
opposition politician called the strikes “neither new, nor decisive, nor exceptional, not even surgical”
(Tharoor 2018).
Although these arguments against viewing the surgical strikes as innovative must be taken into
account, even critics agree that the publicity and framing of the military operation are
unprecedented. When asked about previous such operations carried out by India, then Information
and Broadcasting Minister Venkaiah Naidu pointed out that what set the raids of September 2016
apart was that the “government has sent a signal to Pakistan and the international community”
(Sharma and Venugopal 2016).
Thus, what is innovative is not the choice to carry out focused raids on enemy-held territory, but the
decision to publicize the operations and to designate them as surgical strikes. In June 2015, the
Indian Army carried out a series of operations in the territory of its eastern neighbor, Myanmar,
which were described at the time as ‘surgical strikes.’ The targets were two camps of the National
Socialist Council of Nagaland-K, a militant outfit active in the northeastern border states of Manipur
and Nagaland. At this time, a junior BJP minister, Rajyavardhan Rathore, went on television to warn
that cross-border raids were also possible against Pakistan (Gokhale 2017:loc. 442).

Putting the surgical in ‘surgical strike’: the DGMO press statement

On September 29, 2016, the Director General of Military Operations (DGMO) of the Indian Army,
Lt. Gen. Ranbir Singh, made a statement to the media, at a rare joint press conference of the
Ministries of Defence and External Affairs. This statement deserves to be analyzed in detail as it
reveals the ways in which the military action was framed as “surgical.”
Singh stated (Anon 2016b, emphasis mine):
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Based on very credible and specific information which we received yesterday that some terrorist teams had positioned
themselves at launch pads along the Line of Control with an aim to carry out infiltration and terrorist strikes in
Jammu & Kashmir and in various other metros in our country, the Indian army conducted surgical strikes last night
at these launch pads. The operations were basically focused to ensure that these terrorists do not succeed in their
design of infiltration and carrying out destruction and endangering the lives of citizens of our country.

The italicized words are all intended to convey an impression of precision, accuracy and intelligent
targeting based on information about specific terrorist plots.
Interestingly, an alternative version of this statement reads: “…the Indian Army conducted surgical
strikes at several of these launch pads to pre-empt infiltration by terrorists” (Anon 2016d). This
version includes a mention of pre-emption, which is significant because pre-emption has a precise
meaning in international law. It implies that an attack is imminent and that military force is being
used as a last resort. It is not known why one version includes the word ‘pre-emption,’ however, the
video recording of the press briefing does not include it. Siddharth Varadarajan asserted that “in
legal terms, India has cast the strikes as pre-emptive self-defence” (Varadarajan 2016). However,
Indian authorities eventually came up with the term “anticipatory self-defence,” recognizing the
problematic status of the term ‘pre-emption’ in international law (Begoore 2016).
The DGMO statement is carefully crafted to remove any impression that India was lashing out in
anger:
The matter had been taken up at highest diplomatic levels and through military channels. India has also offered
consular access to these apprehended terrorists for Pakistan to verify their confessions. Furthermore, we had
proposed that fingerprints and DNA samples of terrorists killed in Punch and Uri could be made available to
Pakistan for investigation. Despite our persistent urging that Pakistan respect its January 2004 commitment for not
allowing its soil or territory under its control to be used for terrorism against India, there has been no let up.

This paragraph reinforces the idea that the strikes were a necessary intervention (similar to a medical
intervention—note the clinical terms included), a last resort after the failure of diplomacy. The
statement includes a signal of reassurance: “The operations aimed at neutralizing terrorists have
since ceased. We do not have any plans for further continuation.” This sentence affirms that the
military operation had limited, tactical goals, and that it did not directly target Pakistan.
The statement concludes with a clear signal that the strikes were a demonstration of a larger
determination to push back against Pakistani adventurism. The conclusion, at the same time extends
an offer to cooperate:
… the Indian Armed Forces are fully prepared for any contingency that may arise. It is India’s intention to maintain
peace and tranquillity in the region. But we cannot allow the terrorists to operate across the Line of Control with
impunity and attack citizens of our country at will…we expect the Pakistani army to cooperate with us to erase the
menace of terrorism from the region.

Other statements on surgical strikes
In order to identify statements on the surgical strikes by important decision-makers, a systematic
study of one newspaper (The Times of India) was carried out. A computer program was used to
identify all the articles with titles containing the following terms: pathankot, uri, attack***(any form
of this word), surgical strike, jammu, j&k, army, security, pakistan, terror***(any form of this word).
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The time period was from September 2016 to March 2017. The program then checked for the term
‘Uri’ in the content of the article (to eliminate references to surgical strikes that dealt with nonsecurity related topics). A set of 52 articles was generated through this process, helping to identify
direct quotations from individuals, who were at the time verified top members of the BJP. A study
of these quotations shows that the government framed the strikes as responses to a specific
incursion, in Uri, but promised that they would have a deterrent effect on Pakistan’s support for
terrorism. At the same time, the government was aware of the potential for domestic Indian rhetoric
to provoke an unwanted reaction from Pakistan, and tried to exert control over the situation.
In his very first reaction to the Uri attacks, Prime Minister Narendra Modi promised that the
perpetrators of the attack would be punished (Anon 2016g). The Chief Minister of Goa demanded
that the national government adopt “a more offensive stance” (Anon 2016a). Party officials went
further. Ram Madhav, the National General Secretary of the BJP, stated that the days of strategic
restraint were at an end and promised an asymmetrical response to Pakistan: “For one tooth, the
complete jaw” (Neelakantan 2016b). The Defence Minister commented specifically that India would
not be deterred by Pakistan’s possession of nuclear weapons (Anon 2016f). Thus, the foundation for
a military response was laid.
It is important to note that at the same time, notes of caution were sounded. Former Indian Army
Chief and the Minister of State for External Affairs, V.K. Singh stated the Indian response had “to
be taken without getting influenced by emotions, anger. It has to be taken coolly and with proper
planning” (Anon 2016e). Once the strikes had been announced, the Prime Minister himself
cautioned his ministers against “chest thumping” (Neelakantan 2016a).
These statements show that the Indian government was well aware of the dangers of escalation
based on provocative statements, and wanted to keep control over the rhetorical arena. Further
evidence that official statements were carefully controlled was found in an analysis of tweets by BJP
members of Parliament (either Lok Sabha or Rajya Sabha), and/or BJP national office-bearers as
identified on the party’s website. In this Twitter sample, in the period August 1, 2016 to March 31,
2017 there were no co-occurrences of the terms ‘UP’ or ‘Uttar Pradesh,’ with the terms referring to
the Uri attacks or surgical strikes. Elections were being held in UP during this period, yet BJP leaders
were restrained from explicitly referencing the strikes in election-related tweets. However, the
election campaign did make use of other methods (such as billboards) to reference the strikes
(Sasikumar and Verniers 2018).
The government publicized the military operation in other innovative ways. In June 2018, a video
purporting to show the surgical strikes in real time was released. Although the video was supposedly
leaked, the military confirmed its authenticity (Singh 2018). In September 2018, an official video was
released in an attempt to prove that the strikes had indeed taken place. This intervention is the result
of new technology, and the central role played by video in media consumption worldwide. At the
same time, these releases confirm that the government remains heavily invested, two years after the
fact, in portraying the military operation as consequential, and rebutting allegations that the raids did
not take place.
Another unprecedented development was the publication in 2018, of a portrait of the lead soldier in
the surgical strikes in a general non-fiction paperback book. The first account in the compilation
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India’s Most Fearless, gave details of the 2016 raid while hiding the true identity of the Army major
(Aroor and Singh 2017). Finally, as the second anniversary of the operation approached, the
Defence Ministry declared September 29 as Surgical Strikes Day, and events were organized across
the country to mark the occasion. Critics alleged that these events sought to generate “fake
nationalism” through repeated invocations of the surgical strikes (Joshi 2018)

The reactions to surgical strikes
In this section, the responses by Indian domestic audiences, the Pakistani government, and the
international community are documented. It appears that all three of these audiences reacted in the
manner that the Modi government had anticipated.

Indian domestic audiences
As noted above, the official statement issued in the aftermath of the strikes, strove to present the
military action as motivated solely by national interest and free of party politics. However, it is
important to situate the surgical strikes in the domestic context. While a comprehensive analysis of
the foreign policy of the BJP government, even in the arena of India-Pakistan relations, is outside
the purview of this paper, this sub-section shows that the dominant narrative of the surgical strikes
fortified the position of the government in three ways. First, the media strengthened the image of
the BJP as the ‘party of national security,’ by reinforcing the idea that the strikes were an appropriate
response to Pakistan’s provocations and would deter them in the future. Second, election results
from a key state election show that this dominant narrative was accepted by the majority. Third, the
term ‘surgical strike’ successfully permeated the political discourse, as shown in the discussion of
demonetization.
There has always been concern that domestic politics would fuel inadvertent escalation between
India and Pakistan. The mediatization of the relationship—by which I mean the heightened role of
print and particularly electronic media in presenting facts and opinions to the informed public—
makes the maintenance of stability more difficult. The increase in prosperity and education in India,
led to a rise in the number of news channels. A recent study found that there were 400 television
news channels in India. While the study did not find evidence that the media directly influenced
policy-making, it was influential in “communicating crisis narratives and amplifying the
consequences of crises.” In its examination of media portrayal of the surgical strikes, this study
claimed that the media amplified the government’s narrative on the events and significance of the
military operations (Neog 2018).
The term ‘surgical strikes’ “dominated prime-time debates, social media chatter and dinner-table
conversations” (Guruswamy 2016). In their painstaking analysis of primetime news items on the top
two television channels, during and after the surgical strikes, Sushmita Pandit and Saayan
Chattopadhyay show that the television news (both in English and Hindi) used a variety of rhetorical
strategies to portray the Indian public as completely united in support of the government. Any
questioning of the need for, or the results of, the surgical strikes was criticized, not only by the
government spokespersons appearing on the shows, but the television anchors themselves (Pandit
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and Chattopadhyay 2018). The government’s chosen frame was successful in being adopted by the
informed public.
Elections provide a stringent test of the reception of a government policy. Campaigning for statelevel elections began in Uttar Pradesh (UP), India’s most populous state, in November 2017.
Elections were held in February and March 2017. The BJP won 312 of the 403 seats in the Uttar
Pradesh Assembly and 40% of the votes cast (Verniers 2017). In a pre-election poll of close to
38,000 voters, a vast majority (90 per cent) of UP voters approved of the strikes. About the same
percentage said that Modi had emerged stronger as a result of the action. When asked specifically
whether the surgical strikes would help the BJP at the hustings, 67 per cent predicted that they
would (Jha 2016).
It is not possible to state definitively that the strikes brought about the BJP’s victory. Other factors
contributed; for instance, the shakiness of the alliance between its rivals—the Congress and the
Samajwadi Party (Farooqui and Sridharan 2017). While the number of undecided voters is on the
rise, the BJP’s competitors continued to implement caste-centric strategies, which are now less
effective compared to the charismatic leadership and broad party image (Verniers 2017). Neither is it
possible to cite the victory as evidence that citizens approved of the strikes: a poll conducted in UP
in December 2016 found that only two-thirds of the respondents had heard about the strikes
(Lokniti 2017). However, as Saloni Kapur points out, we can at the very least see the electoral
verdict as acceptance of the ruling regime’s rhetorical framing of the strikes (Kapur 2018:70).
Surgical strikes not only appear to have solved the dilemma of responding to sub-strategic
provocation in a nuclear relationship, but also are in consonance with the image that Narendra
Modi, who dominates foreign policy making in the BJP government, seeks to project. Modi
cultivates the image of a leader willing to take difficult, risky, and initially unpopular decisions in the
national interest. His hallmark is a technocratic style of governance (Ruparelia 2015). The swift,
technology-reliant surgical strikes exemplified Modi’s modus operandi. A similar move in the financial
sector was demonetization. In November 2016, weeks after the surgical strikes, Modi announced
that specific currency notes (of Rs. 500 and Rs. 1000 value) would no longer be legal tender. Home
Minister Rajnath Singh declared: “Rs 500 and Rs 1,000 notes gave strength to those patronising
terrorism. PM has taken away this strength by this ban. Fake Indian currency notes are printed in
Pakistan and circulated in the country to destroy its economy” (Anon 2016c). Here demonetization
is portrayed as a smart move to remove these notes from circulation, thereby reducing terrorism and
frustrating Pakistan’s plans. Finally, Singh described demonetization itself as a surgical strike: “…a surgical
strike has been conducted on corruption” (Anon 2016c).

Pakistan’s reaction

Pakistan flatly denied that a cross-border strike had taken place in September 2016, saying merely
that Indian troops had fired small arms across the LoC, killing two soldiers and injuring nine. The
Inter Services Public Relations, the media wing of the Pakistan military, described this cross-border
firing as an “existential phenomenon,” whereas a strike on Pakistani soil would have elicited a strong
response (Malhotra 2016, emphasis mine). The New York Times quoted a senior Pakistani official,
speaking on the condition of anonymity because he was not authorized to speak publicly, asserting
that Pakistan would have considered a cross-border strike “an act of war” (Barry and Masood 2016).
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By differentiating the location of the camps abutting the LoC, from real Pakistani soil, the Pakistani
government was able to minimize the significance of the strikes.
Leaders in Islamabad chose the face-saving device of denying that a significant strike had been
carried out. They seem to have understood and accepted that their Indian counterparts were
signaling a limited response. “The Indian military was wiser and didn’t go for a deeper strike. They
just fulfilled the wishes of the political leadership without causing any major disaster,” said Maj. Gen.
Mahmud Ali Durrani, a former ambassador to the United States (Gowen 2016). Durrani also
commended the Pakistan government for its muted reaction (Dulat, Durrani and Sinha 2018).

Reaction from the international community
The framing of the operation as a surgical strike helped to foster the impression that India’s reaction
was proportionate, limited, and not a prelude to escalation. India argued that its response was
justified under international law because it was in self-defense, specifically referring to the emerging
post-9/11 international norm that holds states responsible for providing safe haven to non-state
actors who attack other states (Begoore 2016). This argument seems to have resonated, since there
were no condemnations of the strikes by major powers.
The day after the Uri attack, then US Secretary of State John Kerry spoke with his Indian
counterpart and while condemning terrorism, also cautioned against escalation. After the surgical
strikes, the US Ambassador to India, who was visiting Washington DC, rushed back to India. The
United States reiterated its concerns about terrorism and called for India and Pakistan to maintain
channels of communication. When asked specifically whether the United States considered the
surgical strikes an instance of escalation, the State Department spokesperson refused to
“characterize” it (Anon 2016h). Siddharth Varadarajan interprets this as tacit acceptance of Indian
actions by the United States. Pakistan’s denial that a major raid took place also allowed other major
powers to reserve judgment on India’s actions (Varadarajan 2016).

The dangers of surgical strikes
The second section showed how the military operation in 2016 was framed as a surgical strike. This
was an innovation in terminology that allowed India to assuage the public, soothe fears in the
international community, deter future support by Pakistan, and stay under Pakistan’s red lines. The
third section demonstrated that key audiences responded as intended to the BJP government’s
surgical strike framing. However, this consonance may not obtain in the future. This section lists
three flaws inherent in the concept of surgical strikes, which exacerbate the instability of the IndiaPakistan nuclear deterrence relationship.

False promises of precision and efficacy

In the long term, surgical strikes are intended to deter Pakistan from continuing its support to
militants planning attacks on Indian assets, thus reducing infiltration and terrorism. The government
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claimed that the strikes led to a decline in infiltration (Biswas 2017). However, another measure of
stability, cross-border firing, was reportedly at a higher level than before the strikes (Banerjee 2018).
Moreover, just weeks after the surgical strikes, there was another attack on an Indian Army camp in
Nagrota, Jammu (Yasir 2016). Strikes are unlikely to be effective in the medium to long-term in
stabilizing the strategic situation. It is far from given that Pakistani leaders are able to control militant
groups (even if they are willing to rein them in)(Dalton and Perkovich 2016, Popovic 2015). Finally,
even in the absence of foreign infiltration, terrorist attacks in India are likely to continue. This might
lead to frustration among the Indian public, and calls for more stringent action.
Surgical strikes exacerbate the destabilizing presence of non-state actors in the India-Pakistan
relationship, where risks of war are heightened by incomplete information and incentives for states
to misrepresent their ties to non-state violent actors (Bapat 2014). In the short term, framing a
military action as a surgical strike aims to reassure the adversary and other foreign players that it is a
rational, precise, and limited response to a specific provocation. Surgical strikes are devised to stay
under Pakistan’s threshold for nuclear use. Yet this threshold is unclear and shifting, based on a host
of factors such as leaders’ personalities, civil-military relations, economic swings, electoral cycles, and
relations with extra-regional powers such as China, Russia, Saudi Arabia, and the United States. The
risk that Pakistan will react with a nuclear strike on India cannot be eliminated, and the impression
of clinical precision inherent in the term “surgical” may lull Indian decision-makers into ignoring
that risk.

The ratchet effect of iterated surgical strikes

These risks are multiplied when we take into consideration the effect that repeated surgical strikes
will have on the calculations of Pakistani decision-makers. Having suffered the cumulative effects of
limited strikes, they are likely to become extremely reactive and adopt pre-emptive strategies.
Worries about the vulnerability of Pakistan’s relatively small nuclear arsenal will be magnified by
repeated small-scale Indian military operations. The ‘use it or lose it’ mentality when it comes to the
arsenal will lead Islamabad to move sooner to the next rung in the escalation ladder. Indian elites are
cognizant of this danger, of course, but they are unlikely to have enough information about specific
preferences and plans. The illusion that surgical strikes will always be perceived as such in Pakistan as
well as India, is a dangerous and destabilizing one.

Mixed messages and multiple audiences

Clarity is very important in deterrent communication. Speeches, statements, published doctrines, and
military operations “speak for” what are, in effect, mute nuclear weapons (McCanles 1984:14). For
instance, we note that there is confusion about whether the surgical strikes crossed the LoC. The
press briefing by the Indian Army’s Director General of Military Operations (DGMO) describes the
strikes as occuring along and not across the LoC, although the consensus is that these were crossborder strikes. Unofficially, the army says the strikes targeted seven different “terrorist launch pads,”
at a distance of half to one kilometer across the LoC (Varadarajan 2016). Crossing the LoC is
considered a ‘firebreak,’ or a major rung on the escalation ladder, as seen in the Pakistani
government’s insistence that the operation did not take place on Pakistani soil. Therefore, ambiguity
about the definition and intended goals of a surgical strike is dangerous.
Unlike in the Cold War where the United States and the Soviet Union were in dialogue primarily
with each other, India-Pakistan deterrence includes sub-state (militant groups) and extra-regional
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actors (major powers). Consequently, the messages that leaders wish to convey through signaling
become ‘mixed messages.’ One could imagine a scenario in which the Pakistani military pulls back in
the face of a credible threat by India, but the same massive threat pushes militants over the edge and
triggers a surge in suicide attacks.
Since ‘surgical strike’ is an inherently ambiguous term, it may both reassure and frighten. The United
States in 2016 seemed to be in accord with India’s justification for the strike, but may differ in the
future. In fact, Sandeep Singh argues that Pakistan set a trap for India with the Uri attacks. The
Indian strategic community was “restive,” wanting to lash back at Pakistan, and walked into the trap,
by carrying out the cross-border raids (Singh 2016). The implication is that India could have,
inadvertently lost legitimacy with an important strategic partner, the United States.

Conclusion

The term ‘surgical strike’ carries the connotation of a necessary, well-planned intervention targeting
a specific area or actor. It signals to the adversary that the action was deliberately restrained and is
intended to avoid escalation. If Indian elites believe that their military operations across the border
amount to surgical strikes, they are more likely to conduct them. However, the adversary may
disagree as to whether a military action should be designated as a surgical strike, and may perceive it
as crossing the ‘red line’ that justifies nuclear use. This paper examines one specific incident in
depth, to illustrate that the Indian government attempted to frame its military operation as a surgical
strike, that Pakistan and other audiences chose to accept it as such, but that surgical strikes can be
destabilizing in different circumstances.
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